Abstract Exhaustion of a natural resource stock may be a rational choice for an individual and/or a community, even if a sustainable use for the resource is feasible and the resource users are farsighted and well informed on the ecosystem. We identify conditions under which it is optimal not to sustain resource use. These conditions concern the discounting of future benefits, instability of a social system or ecosystem, nonconvexity of natural growth function, socio-psychological value of employment, and strategic interaction among resource users. The identification of these conditions can help design policies to prevent unsustainable patterns of resource use.
Introduction
Sustainability has long been a primary objective of renewable resource management. The notion of sustained yield goes back to at least eighteenth century European forestry (Carlowitz 1713 . Also see Vanclay 1996) . After the publication of ''Our Common Future'' (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) and the United Nation Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, the concept of sustainability has been popularized and regarded as one of the basic social goals. At the same time, most scholars have recognized the vagueness of the concept, raising questions such as: is it to keep physically intact a natural resource or environmental asset? If so, how should one think about the sustainability of a nonrenewable resource? How does it relate to intergenerational equity and intertemporal efficiency? Not surprisingly, economists have come to various definitions of sustainability and differing views about their merits (see, for example, Pearce et al. 1990; Turner et al. 1994; Nordhaus 1994; Solow 1998; Heal 1998; Farzin 2004) .
Whatever the definition of sustainability, it is obvious that finite-time resource extinction defies sustainability. In this paper, we show how a rational agent willingly exhausts a resource in a finite time, even though a sustainable resource use is feasible, or, at least, the resource could be used up over an infinitely long period. The assumption of rationality is important: it enables us to avoid an unsustainable path of resource use by removing the very conditions that render finite-time extinction rational. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to identify the conditions under which finite-time exhaustion of a renewable resource is optimal. These conditions concern (1) the discounting of future benefits, (2) uncertainty about the future of the resource stock, (3) nonconvexity of natural growth function, (4) socio-psychological aspect of work incentives, and (5) strategic interaction among resource users.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces a simple model for resource management to show that heavy discounting makes finite-time extinction optimal. We show that a source of a high discount rate is the uncertainty about the future ecological state of the resource stock or about its future ownership and management. In Sect. 3, we modify the model by allowing nonconvexity in the resource's natural growth function. If an inbreeding depression or an Alee effect exists, the growth function takes a shape that it is convex when the population size (resource stock) is small and concave when it is large. We will see that even with a low discount rate, if the initial stock of the resource is small, the optimal resource policy is finite-time exhaustion. In Sect. 4, the model is extended to incorporate the socio-psychological value of employment. We show that even with a low discount rate and an abundant resource stock, finite-time exhaustion becomes optimal. This is because in this case it is optimal for the resource user to harvest the resource at the maximum harvesting ability. This is an extreme case of extinction: the most rapid extinction. In Sect. 5, we consider a common property resource problem, assuming that multiple agents use the resource. Again, we show that the most rapid extinction is optimal for each individual resource user. At the same time, we show that, under the same condition, sustainable resource use is an optimal policy, too. However, one cannot be sure which optimal policy is adopted. Section 6 concludes with some policy implications of these findings.
Discounting and uncertainty
Let us start with a rudimentary model in resource economics, characterized by the following problem:
subject to _ xðtÞ ¼ f ðxðtÞÞ À cðtÞ; ð1bÞ xðtÞ; cðtÞ > 0; xð0Þ
Here x denotes the stock of a renewable resource. The natural growth of the resource is described by function f(x). Variable c(t) denotes the amount of harvest at time t. Therefore, the evolution of the resource stock is described by Eq. (1b), where _ xðtÞ denotes the time derivative of x(t). The consumption of harvest yields utility to the resource user according to the utility function u(c). We assume that the natural growth function f is hump-shaped and strictly concave, and the utility function u is bounded from below, strictly increasing and strictly concave. See Fig. 1 . Formally, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 u(c) satisfies u(0) = 0, u¢ > 0 and u¢¢ < 0.
The objective of the resource user is to maximize the sum of his discounted utilities from the present time to infinite future, as seen in the objective functional (1a). The discount rate q is the user's time preference parameter. If q is zero, the user values the utilities equally between now and any time in the future, whereas if it is positive, the utilities in the future are valued less than the present utility. In particular, by the power of discounting, the present value of the well-being of a generation living in a far distant future is almost negligible. This implies that the choice of a discount rate raises an ethical problem for intergenerational equity. In fact, in the seminal paper that initiated dynamic analysis in economics, Frank Ramsey, who was a philosopher and mathematician as well as economist, wrote that (discounting) is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination (Ramsey 1928) . It should be noted, however, that discounting could be rationalized from a non-ethical standpoint. For now, let us assume a positive discount rate q > 0. Later, we will justify it for a non-ethical reason: uncertainty.
In order to obtain finite-time extinction as an optimal path, we make an additional assumption:
Assumption 3 f¢(0) = r < ¥ and u¢(0) < ¥.
The first inequality implies that the intrinsic (biological/natural) growth is finite no matter how small the resource stock may be, which is a quite plausible assumption for any renewable resource. The second inequality implies that the marginal value of the resource is finite no matter how scarce it may become, which is also a plausible assumption except in extreme cases where the resource is absolutely vital to life, as would be the case, for example, with water or oxygen. In these cases, if your consumption of water or oxygen shrinks to zero, the value of a unit of them for you, u¢(0), will rise up to infinity. Therefore, you will never exhaust the source of water or oxygen. This explains the necessity of this assumption for optimal finite-time resource exhaustion. However, in a setup with multiple resource users, as in Sect. 5, the finite-time resource extinction could be optimal even if the resource is essential.
To solve the rudimentary problem, it is routine to define the Hamiltonian as H ðc; x; kÞ ¼ uðcÞ þ kðf ðxÞ À cÞ;
where k is called the costate variable or the shadow price of the resource stock. By Pontryagin's maximum principle, there is a function of time k(t), for which an interior optimal control c * (t) and the optimal state x * (t) should satisfy
for each t ‡ 0. From (1b) and (3b), an interior optimal steady state (denoting by subscript ''ss'') satisfies
An optimal steady state (shortly, OSS) is the level of resource stock that once attained, it is optimal to sustain the level. For our model, it can be shown that if an interior OSS x ss * > 0 exists, it is unique and every optimal path starting from any initial stock level monotonically converges to it (see Fig. 2a ). The uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of f (for the monotonicity and stability property, see Hartl 1987; Levhari and Liviatan 1972, respectively) . A long-run target for resource policy is, thus, to tend the interior OSS, and the resource policy is sustainable. However, for an interior OSS to exist, the following necessary condition has to be satisfied: the intrinsic growth rate exceeds the discount rate:
Roughly speaking, this condition requires that the harvesters should not be 'too' impatient to make it worthwhile to extract the resource at a rate faster than the rate at which it is capable to regenerate itself. Otherwise, it would lead to the resource's eventual extinction. In other words, if the discount rate is too high to satisfy inequality (5), the interior OSS would not exist. In this case, the zero stock level (x = 0) is the only OSS and an optimal path starting from any initial resource stock, no matter how large, converges to this level. See Fig. 2b for the typical optimal paths. Furthermore, as proved in the Appendix of this paper, under Assumption 3, it takes only a finite time for the optimal policy to reach this level. The resource policy is unsustainable:
Proposition 1 For the rudimentary problem (1) with Assumptions 1-3, if the discount rate exceeds the intrinsic growth rate (q > r), finiteÀtime extinction is optimal for the resource user no matter how large the initial resource stock size is.
The economic intuition for this proposition is simple: because of the assumption of the concavity of the natural growth function, f¢¢(x) < 0 and the definition of r = f¢(0), the condition that the discount rate q exceeds r implies that at all levels of resource stock, investing in the resource stock (resource conservation) yields a rate of return f¢(x) less than the opportunity cost of that investment q, thus giving the users the incentive not to invest in the resource stock, which means resource depletion to extinction.
As mentioned before, the choice of discount rate raises an ethical problem: that is, how should we value the well-being of future generations? Another problem is that if social preferences are inherent such that they imply too high a social discount rate, thus causing unsustainable resource use, then there is little that one can do to prevent extinction without resorting to regulation of resource harvesting in some fashion. However, independently of any ethical argument, there is another reason for discounting: that is, uncertainty about the future of the resource stock or its ownership. Imagine that a sudden disaster completely destroys the resource, or the resource owner is suddenly deprived of his ownership by, say, confiscation of the resource stock by a corrupt or politically radical government. Note that for environmental conservation or other reasons, a politically radical government may suddenly impose a resource tax whose rate is sufficiently high and/or increases Fig. 2 Optimal resource policy. If the intrinsic growth rate of the resource exceeds the time discount rate (r > q), there is a unique optimal OSS x ss * and every optimal resource policy starting from any initial stock level monotonically converges to it (panel a). If the growth rates is less than or equal to the time discount rate (r £ q), every optimal resource policy is resource exhaustion. In particular, if r < q and Assumption 3 are satisfied, the optimal extinction occurs in a finite time steadily at a constant proportional rate. It will have the equivalent effect as a stochastic resource confiscation/ catastrophe, and as shown here, it will cause finite-time exhaustion to be optimal.
Suppose that this sort of fatal event occurs with a positive probability. Formally, we assume that the agent does not discount future utilities at all. Instead, the parameter q expresses the hazard rate of the Poisson process for the occurrences of the fatal event. Once the fatal event occurs, the utility levels of the resource user thereafter are zero forever. Note that the probability with which the event occurs within the interval of time [t,t + dt) is qe À qt dt. Then, objective functional (1a) is modified as
So, we are back to the rudimentary problem (1a, 1b, 1c), although now q expresses the magnitude of the probability of the fatal event, and not the discount rate. We interpret this result as the following corollary:
Corollary of Proposition 1 FiniteÀtime extinction may be optimal if the ecosystem and/or the socioÀpolitical system is so unstable that the probability of the arrival of the ecological catastrophe or socioÀpolitical upheaval is so high as to exceed the intrinsic growth rate, q > r.
Remark 1 For the derivation of (6), see, for example, Dasgupta and Heal (1979) . Recent models of optimization under uncertainty show that the hazard rate can be viewed as an effective discount rate even when it is not a constant parameter and when the event is not fully fatal (i.e., the post-occurrence welfare does not vanish). See Tsur and Zemel (2006) and the literature therein cited.
Nonconvexity of a natural growth function
In this section, we focus on the natural growth function. A concave growth function implies that the natural growth rates increase as the size of the resource stock decreases (f¢¢(x) < 0). However, as is well known in population biology literature, if the stock size is very small, the growth rate may be small, for example, due to an Alee effect or an inbreeding depression. Then, we may have a convex-concave shape of the growth function, as in Fig. 3 . Now, consider the rudimentary problem (1a) with modification of Assumption 1 as follows:
Notice that because of the convexity of f(x) on [0,x I ], the condition f¢(0) < q is a milder assumption than the corresponding one in the previous case of concave growth function in that discount rate q need no longer be greater than the growth rate f¢(x) at all stock levels. In fact, it may be less than that for some stock levels. There are two stock levels at which the slope of the growth function equals to the discount rate, shown in Fig. 3 at the tangency points. The larger one x ss * corresponds to the OSS for the original rudimentary model (1a). The smaller one, x q , is new. However, it can be shown that x q is not an OSS (see Akao and Farzin 2006) . Therefore, we have potentially two optimal paths: one converges to the interior optimal sustainable resource stock level and the other converges to zero stock level, i.e., extinction in a finite time. Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose the existence of optimal paths. Under Assumption 4, there exists a threshold x c 2(0,¥] such that if x 0 < (> )x c , the optimal path monotonically converges to 0(x ss * ). Furthermore, the threshold satisfies x c < x ss * , if the following mild discounting condition holds:
Proof See Akao and Farzin (2006) . Notice that compared to Proposition 1, while the convex-concavity of the growth function modifies the requirement that the discount rate should exceed the growth rate at all stock levels in order for the finite time extinction to be optimal, it also weakens Proposition 1 in that a finite time extinction is optimal only if the initial resource stock is less than a critical level. Figure 4 illustrates the optimal paths. Even with a very low discount rate, in the presence of non-concavity of natural growth function, finite-time extinction may be optimal if the resource stock has been already degraded (by, for example, overexploitation thus far) below the critical threshold. This threshold x c is called the Skiba point or DNS point. Remark 2 If the reverse inequality holds in Proposition 2, then the interior OSS disappears, so that despite the convex-concave condition of the growth function the only optimal policy is extinction in a finite time starting from any initial stock level.
Remark 3 ''DNS'' are the initials of three authors, Dechert, Nishimura and Skiba. Skiba (1978) first introduced the convex-concave production function in the theory of optimal growth in economics. A rigorous analysis for a discrete time model is given by Dechert and Nishimura (1983) . Gustav Feichtinger and his collaborators have recently studied the continuous time models and their applications. See, for example, Deissenberg et al. (2001) and Hartl et al. (2004) , which contain the literature review in economic dynamics with nonconvexity, including environmental economics.
Non-pecuniary value of employment: a socio-psychological aspect
It is natural to think that working is not only a means of earning income, but also a form of social involvement. Because of this, unemployment usually brings a person unhappiness more than loss of income does, which may include, for example, losses of dignity, confidence and identity. In other words, there is a non-pecuniary value of employment. Curiously enough, this fact has been ignored in traditional economics until recently. Farzin and Akao (2006) incorporate this socio-psychological aspect explicitly into a bio-economic model and find that the optimal resource use may be finite-time extinction. In this section, we introduce their results with a simpler model than theirs.
We modify the utility part of the rudimentary problem (1a) as follows:
Assumption 5 uðc; EÞ; E 2 ½0; " E; E ¼ working time:
The utility stems from two sources. One is consumption of harvests as before. The other source is working. Different from a standard economic model, here working is not a source of disutility, but a source of utility. Although this assumption may seem curious, Farzin and Akao (2004) show that under standard assumptions in economics, non-pecuniary value of work exceeds the value of leisure at very low income levels.
Assume that all the labor is used to extract the resource, which is the case where there is no alternative employment other than resource extraction. The relationship between labor input E and resource output c is described with the cost function E(c). There is an upper bound for working time " E; which limits the maximum harvest level. Denote the maximum harvest level by " H ; which satisfies " E ¼ Eð " HÞ: We assume that with the maximum effort " E; the resource is certainly exhausted in a finite time:
The maximum harvest level with full employment exceeds the maximum sustained yield (MSY): " H[f ðx MSY Þ; where x MSY is the stock level yielding of the maximum sustainable harvest.
Remark 4 See Fig. 1 for the geography of the stock of maximum sustained yield, x MSY , which in general does not coincide to the interior OSS, x ss * , although MSY has been a long-run target of natural resource management. Clark (1976) discusses these two concepts at some length.
It is important to notice that even though working is a source of utility, the full employment " E is not necessarily an optimal choice. This is because the full employment may degrade the resource too much to allow sustaining future consumptions. Recall that we have supposed that the resource user is rational enough and in particular farsighted.
Although it is mathematically invariant, let us add a flavor of macro economics to the rudimentary model (1). Consider a community, in which the local people are governed by a benevolent government. Everyone has identical preferences and the same harvesting technology, as described above. Let n be the population size. The problem of the benevolent government is:
subject to _ xðtÞ ¼ f ðxðtÞÞ À ncðtÞ; ð7bÞ 0 6 EðcÞ 6 " H ; xð0Þ ¼ x 0 given:
Pontryagin's maximum principle suggests that an optimal control c* maximizes the Hamiltonian:
where
Assume that the reduced form utility function U is strictly convex in c. The following example shows that such a convex utility function is obtained with standard Fig. 4 Optimal paths when the natural growth function is convexconcave. In the case with a convex-concave natural growth function, there is a critical stock level of the resource x C . If the initial stock is higher than the critical level, the optimal path converges to the interior steady state, so that the optimal resource policy is sustainable. If the initial stock is lower than the critical level, the optimal path goes to zero stock level in a finite time, so that the optimal resource policy is unsustainable assumptions in economics, if we allow working to be a source of utility.
Example Let utility function have a form of u(c,E) = c a E g , with 0 < a < 1 and 0 < g < 1 À a (so that u is increasing and concave jointly in c and E, a standard assumption of economics). The harvesting technology is expressed by E(c) = c b with b > 1, which is also a standard assumption of economics: a cost function is convex and increasing. If the elasticity of marginal utility of employment is sufficiently high to satisfy b
2 U/dc 2 > 0, the maximum of the Hamiltonian is attained at a corner of c. That is, the optimal control c* is either of the full harvesting cÃ ¼ " H or no harvesting c* = 0. Also, notice that there is no interior optimal control and thus no interior OSS. Therefore, the optimal path of the resource stock converges either to the carrying capacity or to zero. It is, however, obvious that the path going to the carrying capacity is suboptimal, because there is no chance to harvest at all. Therefore, we have:
2 > 0, full employment is always optimal. On an optimal path the resource stock decreases most rapidly and becomes extinct in a finite time.
(The formal proof, including the existence of an optimal path, is found in Farzin and Akao 2006.) If the harvest level with full employment exceeds the MSY, full employment and sustainable resource management are incompatible objectives, and in Farzin and Akao's framework, the former is chosen over the latter as the optimal policy. Population growth and technological progress in resource extraction may bring about such a situation. The optimal path has two novelties. First, the optimal resource extinction is an extreme one, the most rapid extinction. Second, resource extinction is optimal irrespective of the state of the resource stock and the magnitude of the discount rate. Notice that in this section, we have referred neither to the discount rate nor to the initial level of the resource stock, which were crucial factors for finite-time extinction to be optimal in the previous sections.
Remark 5 Without invoking non-pecuniary value of employment, we could obtain the most rapid extinction as an optimal path. It is necessary, however, to specify the utility and natural growth functions that satisfy the restrictive conditions derived by Spence and Starrett (1975) . Heavy discounting is also needed.
Strategic interaction
In this section, we consider a natural resource used by multiple users. Such a resource may be categorized by its physical property into two types. The first type is a resource for which it is difficult to establish and force a definite property right. The global atmosphere, underground aquifers, and highly migratory fish stocks are a few examples. The second type is a resource that, although its private or governmental holding is physically possible, is owned communally for institutional or historical reasons. An example is the high seas defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Another example is a local communal forest in Japan, which is a relic of the Edo era (1603-1868), at which time private ownership of a forest was prohibited.
We will show that for those resources, finite-time extinction may be optimal from the viewpoint of each rational user, despite the fact that it is by no means socially or cooperatively optimal. In other words, we will see the individual optimality of the so-called ''tragedy of the commons.'' However, it turns out that finitetime extinction is not the only non-cooperative optimal path and under certain conditions a sustainable resource use is optimal, too. Therefore, the tragedy of the commons is not an inevitable destiny. This could explain the fact that some communal resources have been managed in a sustainable way, at least apparently and so far.
A fundamental change from the previous models is that not a single agent, but many agents use the resource. We assume that the number of resource users n ‡ 2 is fixed. In the terminology of economics, this sort of resource is called a common property resource or a common pool resource. The resource users are identical in their preferences and harvesting technology. As in the previous section, there exists the upper bound of the harvest ability " hð¼ " H =nÞ[0: Modifying the rudimentary model (1), we study the following differential game model:
subject to _ xðtÞ ¼ f ðxðtÞÞ À ðn À 1ÞrðxÞ À cðtÞ; ð8bÞ cðtÞ 2 ½0; " h; xð0Þ
where r(x) is the common harvesting strategy of all other users, which is assumed to depend only on the common pool resource stock, and in particular, to be time independent. An example of such a strategy is the most rapid extinction strategy defined as below:
which harvests with the maximum effort as far as the resource exists. When the other players use the same strategy r(x), the problem for each player is written as in (8a, 8b, 8c) above. If the optimal solution is described by the same strategy r(x), r(x) constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium because once all players choose their strategies, then no one wants to deviate from it. Such equilibrium also has the property that even if some players deviate from the equilibrium strategy at some point in time, the equilibrium strategy will be still optimal if at later time the players return to that equilibrium strategy. This property in economics is referred to as strongly time consistent or as ''subgame perfect.'' Finally, it is symmetric since all players adopt the same strategy. For analytical simplicity, we will restrict our concern to this type of equilibrium, i.e., symmetric Markov perfect Nash equilibrium.
Notice that the problem of each resource user now becomes more complicated than the ones in the previous sections, because other users also harvest the resource and their harvest rates affect the user's action, which affects, in turn, other users' actions. This is the strategic interaction.
The cooperative or social optimization problem, compared with non-cooperative problem (8a, 8b, 8c), is formulated as follows:
Àqt dt subject to _ xðtÞ ¼ f ðxðtÞÞ À ncðtÞ;
cðtÞ 2 ½0; " h; xð0Þ ¼ x 0 given:
Maintain Assumptions 1, 2, and
We deliberately make this assumption to sharply distinguish the roll of strategic interaction in generating the optimality of finite time extinction from that of the high discount rate studied in Sect. 2. The cooperative problem above has the same property as the rudimentary problem (1) in mathematical terms. To see this, define the aggregate harvests by C(t) = nc(t) and rewrite the instantaneous utility as a function of C(t):U(C(t)) = u(C(t)/n). Finally, verify that U(C) satisfies Assumption 2. Therefore, every optimal cooperative path of the resource stock monotonically converges to a unique social OSS, x ss * > 0, such that f¢(x ss * ) = q. The cooperative resource policy is sustainable.
We want to show that finite-time exhaustion is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., individuals' rational choice. To do so, unlike the previous section, we do not need Assumption 3 (the finiteness of the marginal utility u¢(0) < ¥ and the marginal productivity f¢(0) < ¥ at the origin). Instead, we assume The first inequality is the same assumption as Assumption 6 in the previous section. That is, with the maximum harvesting effort, the resource is exhausted in a finite time. The second inequality ensures that if other users harvest the resource with the maximum effort, there is no way for an individual user to sustain the social OSS, x ss * , because simply it is infeasible. The third and forth inequalities restrict the curvature of utility function. These assumptions are technical, but standard in economics.
The following proposition on equilibrium resource use is given by Sorger (1998) .
Proposition 4 (Sorger1998) (a) The most rapid extinction strategy (9) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following inequality holds: 
(b) There is a continuum of the other Nash strategies if f(x ss * ) > nf¢(x ss * )x ss * . Each strategy is sustainable in the sense that the associated equilibrium path of the resource stock converges to a positive stock level in (0,x ss * ).
We refer to the strategy in Proposition 4(b) as Sorger's strategy, which is sustainable and under certain conditions can almost replicate the social optimum, although it always yields a payoff to each individual user which is less than what they would gain under the social optimum. In contrast, the most rapid extinction is the worst strategy, from the viewpoint of sustainability. The inequality in Proposition 4(a) holds when the number of users n is large, the maximum harvest rate " h is high, or the discount rate of each user q is high. In any of these cases, finite-time extinction is optimal from an individual's viewpoint.
A troublesome, but interesting, point is that the most rapid extinction may coexist with Sorger's strategies as an equilibrium strategy and we cannot predict which equilibrium arises. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 with the following specification: the utility function is isoelastic, the natural growth function is described by a logistic equation, and q is fixed at a rather low level, since we have already seen how heavy discounting brings finitetime extinction. In Fig. 5 , there are two areas: one is the area on which Sorger's strategies constitute equilibria and the other is the area on which the most rapid extinction strategy becomes an equilibrium strategy. Observe that these two areas overlap.
The coexistence of two types of equilibria means that the individually optimal resource policy for a common property resource is ambiguous and unstable. It is possible on a theoretical ground, that for two communities with identical resource stock and individual preferences, one uses its natural resource in a sustainable way, whereas the other exhausts its resource at the most rapid speed to leading to finite time extinction. The interest in this result is its potential to explain the observation that the resource based communities with similar economic and resource conditions have experienced the different resource management outcome, some are successful in sustaining their resources, while the others have depleted them to extinction. Another interesting implication of this theoretical result is that it can explain the possibility that a community which has been using its resource in a sustainable way for a period of time may suddenly switch to a ruinous resource use path without any evident trigger.
Remark 6 Another resource modeling with multiple users is that of an open access resource problem, for which the number of the users varies. Anonymous agents freely enter to extract the resource, until their temporal profits equilibrate to zero. For this setup, the mechanism causing finite-time extinction is quite simple. That is, it occurs if the aggregate harvest levels corresponding to zero profit always exceed the natural growth rates of the resource (Berck 1979) . Also, notice that an open access resource problem can be regarded as the limit case of the problem (1) with q fi ¥ (Beddington et al. 1975) . Therefore, the results in the second section are applied.
Concluding remarks
We conclude these observations with their policy implications.
First, we have seen how uncertainty raises discount rate and how a high discount rate brings finite-time resource extinction. To prevent such a situation, we need to mitigate the risk of the fatal events. For example, political stability matters. Furthermore, such a policy should be implemented early on, if the growth function of the resource exhibits nonconvexity and the resource is being degraded. This is because when the resource has been already degraded, finite-time extinction is more prone to be an optimal resource use policy even with a low discount rate.
Second, we have seen that non-pecuniary value of employment makes people give priority to full employment over sustainable resource use. Farzin and Akao (2006) show that the remedy is none but to create alternative employment sources to absorb labor force which is excessive from the viewpoint of sustainable resource use. They also suggest that earlier policy implementation is more prudent, since when the resource is more degraded, higher wage rates may be necessary to prevent resource exhaustion.
Third, we have seen a strategic interaction cause the most rapid extinction, which is an extreme case of finitetime resource extinction. Although all common property resources do not have such a fate as predicted by Hardin (1968) , all of them share the possibility. Breaking such an interaction is the primal policy to prevent the most rapid extinction. Akao (2001 Akao ( , 2004 shows that among standard economic policy measures, a tax on harvest does not work well, whereas tradable permits or quota system works to realize sustainable and efficient resource usage. Another prospective prescription is privatization. However, a caution is given by Dasgupta and Ma¨ler (1997) . They have pointed out that, in the real world, the consequence of privatization of a common property resource may be further resource degradation. This is due to the existing inequality in a rural community. If the resource is not favorably distributed to the poor, they cannot help but to encroach on the resource.
Finally, resource-sector technological assistance and income assistance may not help to prevent finite-time extinction. In particular, if a technological assistance improves the harvesting efficiency, and hence the maximum harvesting ability, it may even accelerate resource extinction.
OSS. Therefore, we conclude that every optimal path converges to x = 0. Notice that a strictly decreasing optimal path implies c * (t) > f(x * (t)) > 0 and thus the optimal control c * (t) is interior as far as x * (t) > 0. Therefore, the maximum condition k(t) = u¢(c * (t)) (Eq. 3a in the main text) holds over the periods such that x * (t) > 0. 
where the strict inequality follows from q > f¢(0) > f¢(x) for x > 0 and lim t!T kðtÞ[kð0Þ (since _ kðtÞ[0). Suppose T = ¥. Then, (A1) implies lim t!T k Ã ðtÞ ¼ 1: However, this contradicts the maximum condition (3a), u¢(c * (t)) = k * (t), since the marginal utility is finite ðlim c!0 u 0 ðcÞ\1Þ by Assumption 3. Therefore,T < ¥, i.e., the resource is optimally exhausted in a finite time.
